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Abstract  
Drawing upon the debate on institutional mediation of macro processes, we examine how 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) engage with global competition through restructuring their 
operations situated in local supply chain environments and how employment relations (ER) of 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) are reconfigured in the course of this restructuring 
process. Our empirical setting is the German chemical industry which is both an exemplar of 
coordinated labour-management-collaboration and highly exposed to global competition. Us-
ing a comparative case study design, we observe how MNEs re-structure two local production 
sites into ‘Chemieparks’. Our empirical data suggest that local agency diverges in the extent 
to which the social partnership type of ER is maintained or disrupted. Furthermore, we high-
light the importance of micro-political practices for understanding the restructuring outcome 
as well as the local enactment and change of macro institutions within production networks as 
meso-level arenas for institutional mediation. 
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Introduction 
In comparative Human Resource Management (HRM) and employment relations (ER) re-
search, practices are found to vary across countries in a systematic way, due to their embed-
dedness in nation-specific institutional settings of capitalism (Wilkinson, Wood, & Deeg, 
2014). Among the coordinated varieties of West European capitalism, one exemplar is Ger-
many with a distinct institutional configuration in which industry-wide, multi-employer col-
lective wage bargaining keeps much of the wage conflict out of the local shop floor, and em-
ployee representation through works councils establishes collaborative management-labour 
relations on the workplace-level. In combination with other institutional features such as su-
pervisory board co-determination or tripartite coordination in occupational training systems, 
Germany is often considered a paradigmatic case of a Coordinated Market Economy (CME) 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001). But, Germany’s coordinated market economy has seen considerable 
changes in the area of ER over the last two decades: The coverage of multi-employer collec-
tive agreements has been in decline for over a decade now and union membership has 
dropped below 20 per cent of the workforce, accompanied with the emergence of one of the 
largest low-wage sectors among European countries (Bosch & Weinkopf 2008; Appelbaum & 
Schmitt, 2009; Palier & Thelen, 2010). Taking a macro perspective on this development, 
some scholars interpret this as a general trend towards liberalisation and the convergence of 
particular models towards one single model (Streeck, 2009), whereas others speak of ‘varie-
ties of liberalisation’ (Thelen, 2014) or ‘converging divergences’ (Katz &	  Darbishire, 2000), 
thereby stressing the continuity of certain elements in the institutional environments coping 
with global pressures.  
Examining these dynamics within Germany as a CME offers a unique opportunities for theory 
development and refinement regarding the important question of how pressures stemming 
from global competition are mediated by and through existing institutions, and how these in-
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stitutions may undergo reconfiguration in this process. This relates to recent advances in 
comparative capitalisms research towards acknowledging local and sectoral variations within 
configurations of nations (e.g. Crouch, Schröder & Voelzkow, 2009) as well as the relevance 
of more global pressures that national institutions face (e.g. Jessop, 2011). Here, we take the 
perspective that these multi-level phenomena involve relational agency, i.e. actors locally 
enacting institutions against the backdrop of global pressures, and thereby providing for one 
source of micro level institutional variety in capitalisms.  
Because of the dominant macro-level perspective of much of the comparative capitalisms 
literature, we still know surprisingly little about micro-level dynamics and how the potentially 
transformative capacity of global competition is enacted in industries (Barry & Nienhueser, 
2010; Campbell & Pedersen, 2007) and organisations (Marchington, 2015). This is an im-
portant research gap, because it is at the level of the local supply chain environment where 
institutions, HR/ER practices, and organisational restructuring of Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs) intersect (Collings, 2008). We contribute to filling this gap by theorising and examin-
ing how global competition is enacted through local agency, i.e. micro-political practices in 
local restructuring processes (Sorge, 2005). For that purpose, we draw on the micro politics 
approach within the MNE literature (Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2014; Morgan & Kristensen, 
2006) and extend this by delving deeper into the question of how institutional resources are 
enacted within local supply chain environments from a practice perspective (e.g. Giddens, 
1984).  
Based on these considerations, we address the following research question: How do actors 
locally engage with institutions of ER/HR in multi-employer arrangements? For answering 
this question, we look at the interorganisational restructuring of local production sites into 
multi-employer sites (Marchington, Rubery, & Grimshaw, 2011). In particular, we explore 
collective wage-setting arrangements in two German ‘Chemieparks’ (chemical parks) in a 
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qualitative, comparative case study research design. Chemical parks are a suitable case for our 
question as they stand pars pro toto for a production in multi-employer sites, i.e. locally 
bound production networks in which multi-employer work arrangements flourish. Multi-
employer work arrangements are those in which “the employment experiences of workers are 
shaped—to a greater or lesser extent—by more than one employer in contexts where organi-
sations collaborate across boundaries to jointly produce goods or provide services” (March-
ington et al., 2011: 314). 	  
Our findings reveal how global competition and accompanying pressure on MNEs for out-
sourcing and disintegrating production is locally enacted within the German institutional envi-
ronment. In particular, we observe how restructuring gives rise to distinct local micro-politics 
in which management and labour representatives use different practices: constructing ration-
alities, political strategising, and mobilising specific resources in order to engage in a dispute 
over the scope and depth of restructuring. The varying effects of these micro-political practic-
es around the formation of multi-employer sites have different repercussions for the broader 
institutional fabric of Germany as a CME. While both cases in our study illustrate how the 
traditional labour-management-coordination is coming under pressure, we observe that in one 
case ERs are adapted along a collaborative path, whereas in the other case a more unilateral 
Liberal Market Economy (LME)-type of ER takes shape. Based on our findings, we conclude 
that the interorganisational network-level constitutes an important arena in which national 
institutions are enacted in local practice, thereby increasing variance within nationally bound 
institutional settings (cf. Lane & Wood, 2009). In addition, we argue that local production 
networks could emerge as an arena for coordinating business activities in response to global 
competition. Hence, we suggest that local production networks constitute an important unit of 
analysis for a better understanding of how global economic pressure are mediated in (micro) 
political processes, and how this leads to patterns of variation within macro-level institutional 
configurations.  
6 
MNE restructuring and HR/ER practices in local supply chain environments  
While earlier research on comparative capitalisms suggests that macro-institutional structures 
are relatively stable over time, even if exposed to global competition (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Whitley, 1999), other work has stressed that MNEs may gradually undermine the stability of 
institutionalised patterns as MNEs introduce new practices or coordination mechanisms into a 
foreign institutional environment (Campbell & Pedersen, 2007; Fortwengel & Jackson, 2016; 
Jackson & Deeg, 2008). For example, MNE activities may interfere with broad typifications 
of employment relations in at least two analytically distinct ways, namely by introducing new 
variety in HR policies within a given institutional configuration (e.g. Ferner, Almond & Col-
ling, 2005; Ferner & Quintanilla, 1998), and through bypassing the national level institutions 
for mediating the relationships between the macro and micro levels—such as employer coor-
dination via their national associations, for example—in directly connecting the global with 
the local level in practice. In this paper, we are predominantly concerned with the latter. For 
approaching the question in more detail of how local MNE restructuring might have an im-
pact in institutional change of HR/ER practices, first, we draw on the macro view by discuss-
ing the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) and the variegated capitalism (VC) literatures; and se-
cond, building on these, we derive our own view that considers the micro-politics in local 
supply chain environments in more depth. 
From a macro to a local view on capitalist variety 
Despite dealing with different analytic levels, both the VoC and the VC approach have a 
common ground in trying to explain institutional variety. However, these approaches differ in 
the way they account for local actors and their agency in processes of institutional change. 
Using a comparative macro lens, the VoC approach typically groups whole economies and 
countries along specific dimensions of coordination (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Furthermore, it is 
argued that collective actors solve common coordination problems differently across institu-
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tional settings on a macro scale. In this view, actors are economically rational actors that try 
to realise comparative advantages within historically grown institutional constraints. Hence, 
the VoC approach sees institutional diversity between countries based on a stylised economic 
agency of firms that becomes rather stable as it is inscribed into the fabric of country-specific 
governance mechanisms; creating and sustaining comparative institutional advantage in the 
process (Hall & Soskice, 2001). For the VoC framework, the key dimension is whether firms 
predominantly coordinate their business activities by relying on arm’s-length market transac-
tions (as in LMEs, such as the United States and the United Kingdom), or rather use strategic 
forms of coordination and collaboration (as in CMEs, such as Germany and Japan) (Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009).  
Seen from a VoC perspective, HR/ER practices of MNEs are expected to follow either a LME 
or CME pattern. For example, MNEs operating within a LME context may predominantly 
rely on unilateral wage setting and individual wage negotiations in fluid labour markets, while 
MNEs operating within a CME context should rely on taking wages out of direct competition 
through industry-wide collective wage agreements negotiated between industrial unions and 
employer associations. However, MNEs occupy a unique position that spans national and 
institutional borders, and thus are exposed to competing sets of pressures and dominant forms 
of solving coordination problems (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Tempel & Walgenbach, 
2007). Hence, MNEs are described as being “partly bound by the existing institutional 
framework that they encounter, but partly acting to alter it” (Crouch et al., 2009: 654).  
Meanwhile, what is often neglected is that MNEs operate in a particular local or sectoral envi-
ronment (Crouch et al., 2009). Here, the VC approach—originally coming from economic 
geography—can help, because it focuses on diversity within countries, i.e. regions or indus-
try-specific institutional configurations (e.g. Peck & Theodore, 2007). In contrast to the VoC 
approach, the VC approach puts localised specificities of economic relations—or what we call 
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'local supply chain environments'—centre stage in that it emphasises coordination mecha-
nisms at a sub-national level. Furthermore, VC uses “a more explicitly ‘relational’ conception 
of variety” (Peck & Theodore, 2007: 761), in which “structural formations and extralocal 
conventions, and the patterned relations between ‘local’ capitalisms” are key	  (Peck & Theo-
dore, 2007: 764). By this token, the idea of structural coupling of various types of capitalism 
on various scales is addressed, i.e. the location-specific recombination of particular institu-
tional elements within the process of institutional change (cf. Peck & Theodore, 2007: 759) to 
account for the temporal-spatial embeddedness of economic activity (Jessop, 2011; Peck & 
Theodore, 2007). In this paper, we explore this idea of temporal-spatial embeddedness to 
study production networks in their local supply chain environment. 
MNE restructuring and local production networks 
In agreement with earlier contributions to the debate, we see that the local rather than the na-
tional level offers unique promise to capture how global processes are enacted by and in 
MNEs in relation to institutional contexts (Lane & Wood, 2009; Sorge, 2005). Previous re-
search suggests that local-level processes can be an impetus for more macro-level dynamics, 
“since governance of the local economy decouples itself from national institutions and devel-
ops its own institutional dynamics, local innovation and production regimes are likely to be 
entry gates for institutional change" (Crouch et al., 2009: 673). In other words, both, the trans-
fer of practices and the emergence of locally bound production networks through MNEs ques-
tions the applicability of broad typologies of capitalisms, because macro institutions have to 
be enacted and reproduced within and across organizations operating at the local level. As 
such, institutions often materialise and receive meaning on the ground (Morgan & Kristensen, 
2006).  
MNE restructuring might lead to variations in terms of work and employment practices within 
a national economy (Holst, 2014; Katz & Darbishire 2000). Beyond offshoring, MNEs direct-
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ly link their strategising in global competition to local restructuring of production operations, 
not in the least due to the global diffusion of the shareholder value doctrine (Fiss & Zajac, 
2004; Jürgens, Naumann, & Rupp, 2000; Lane, 2003). MNEs engage in various forms of re-
structuring of their local operations, including domestic subcontracting or fissuring workplac-
es (Weil, 2014). In other words, corporate restructuring efforts often culminate in reconfigur-
ing locally bound production sites into production networks (Bair, 2008; Cumbers, Nativel, & 
Routledge, 2008). In some cases, this even includes those activities formerly considered to be 
core competencies of the firm (Contractor, Kumar, Kundu, & Pedersen, 2010). At the same 
time, outsourcing and disintegration gives rise to new kinds of interorganisational relation-
ships (Grimshaw & Rubery, 2005) in and through which the interplay of production activities 
of a now larger number of small and typically highly specialised firms needs to be coordinat-
ed in the locally bound production network. This phenomenon asks for going beyond macro-
level explanations and explanations confined to the single, hierarchically integrated organisa-
tion, at the same time (Sydow & Windeler, 1998).  
However, in a CME setting like Germany, this sort of local network coordination is not the 
same thing as strategic coordination organised by ‘encompassing’ employer and business as-
sociations with alleged clear formal membership rules and representational hierarchies. There 
might be advanced forms of cluster management (for an example see Sydow, Lerch, & Staber, 
2010), but other local networks are more loosely coupled, i.e. representing spatial agglomera-
tion without social ties and a common network identity (Staber, 2010). And although the re-
search on industrial districts highlights the different modes of governance (Arikan & Schil-
ling, 2011), locally bound production sites are also not to be equated with industrial districts, 
i.e. those "territories with a concentration of firms linked by relational contracting, i.e. long-
term contracts to cooperate in business either across stages of a supply chain (...) or within a 
particular stage of a chain" (Sorge, 2005: 176). While multi-employer sites might evolve into 
the nucleus of such districts, not least as a result of local agency, our cases of the chemical 
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industry resemble more the product of the dissolution of former conglomerates (Kädtler, 
2009).  
These distinctions are important to avoid confusion of the effects of various network types 
regarding the VoC debate. For example, industrial districts afford supporting institutions or 
the provision of ‘collective competition goods’ such as industry-specific research, vocational 
training or industrial relations as competitiveness enhancing infrastructures (Crouch et al. 
2009; Sorge, 2005). Local ‘multi-employer’ sites cut across sectors, and thereby, hollow out 
established arrangements for strategic coordination by weakening the functioning of extant 
forms of industry-specific collaboration (Croucher & Wood, 2015). Meanwhile, production 
networks might potentially be organised in a way that they have functional parallels to tradi-
tional forms of strategic coordination which raises the issue of agency in their emergence.  
Micro-politics and ERs in multi-employer sites  
In our case setting, we are particularly concerned with the micro-political practice of local 
actors who locally enact and mediate institutions against the backdrop of global pressures 
from MNE restructuring. The observation of sub-national institutional mediation alone, how-
ever, is not sufficient for explaining the contribution of local agency. For example, the VC 
approach also acknowledges institutional agency by emphasising the possibilities of conflict 
and contestation (Peck & Theodore, 2007), but fails to specify how actors engage in respec-
tive practices. To address this issue we draw on micro-political approaches to study the prac-
tices and processes involved in local agency (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2011; Geppert & Dö-
rrenbacher 2014). However, while extant research from a micro-politics in MNEs perspective 
has dealt with the micro-politics at the local level of production sites (for example Blazejew-
ski, 2009; Sharpe, 2006), most studies have focused on conflicts and negotiations within 
MNEs, most prominently between headquarters and subsidiaries (e.g. Geppert & Williams, 
2006), or how global production networks relate to transnational labour activism (e.g. Coe & 
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Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Rainnie, Herod & McGrath-Champ, 2011). Much less attention has been 
paid to the issue of ER in governing production networks and supply chains bound to local 
environments (but for a recent exception see Anderson, 2015). 
To account for this ‘relational agency’ to be expected in these local settings, we draw on or-
ganisational theory which highlights the performative aspects of agency, i.e. how actors who 
are reflective of the institutions in their social environment engage with (and change) them 
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 1984; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). One of our core 
assumptions is that the (inter-)organisational practices that shape ER/HR practices are neither 
explained solely by institutional constraints nor entirely independent from institutionalised 
repertoires for action (cf. Seo & Creed, 2002).  In other words, we argue that the various par-
ties involved in the employment relationship engage in social praxis (Barley & Tolbert, 1997), 
in and through which they collectively produce and reproduce (new) structures as they strug-
gle over creating new rules in ER as well as maintaining or disrupting existing ones (Law-
rence et al., 2009).  
Here, we account for the fact that local restructuring does not necessarily lead to an institu-
tionally pre-determined outcome, because these processes are mediated through a political 
process within a multi-level global arena (Fichter, Stevis, & Helfen, 2012). We use a theoreti-
cal framework that captures the activities and processes involved in the enactment and prac-
tice of global competition in local supply chain environments. In order to account for the local 
supply chain environment, we focus on studying multi-employer work arrangements (March-
ington et al., 2011) within local production sites. Such multi-employer sites can be found in 
virtually every industry from traditional manufacturing industries, like car manufacturing or 
the chemical industry (Doellgast & Greer, 2007; Kädtler, 2009), to service industries (e.g. 
shopping malls, airports) or cultural production (e.g. theatres) (Flecker, Haidinger, & 
Schönauer, 2013; Haunschild, 2003). Within these locally bound production sites, various 
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multi-employer arrangements flourish, e.g. contract assembling, third party provision of ser-
vices like logistics, maintenance, repair, and cleaning or manpower services (e.g. Capelli & 
Keller, 2013; Havard, Rorive, & Sobczak, 2009). 
In terms of HR/ER practices, the distinguishing feature of work in multi-employer sites is that 
employees work in a local supply chain environment in which working and employment con-
ditions depend to a significant degree on the network layer to which the employing organisa-
tion belongs, i.e. whether the work is performed by workers directly employed by core clients 
or by service providers. As these units differ in their relative bargaining power within the pro-
duction network, multi-employer work arrangements entail considerable implications for ER 
and managing workforces as traditional HRM measures devised for the integrated firm might 
not apply or produce adverse effects (e.g. Banerjee, Tolbert, & DiCiccio, 2012; Fisher, Gra-
ham, Vachon, & Vereecke, 2010). More generally, multi-employer arrangements reshuffle 
previous forms of work segmentation and existing modes of labour regulation are questioned, 
unsettled, and potentially dismantled. This may involve previously taken-for-granted roles 
and functions for both, management (Kinnie, Swart, & Purcell, 2005) as well as the workforce 
(Jolink & Dankbaar, 2010; Marchington et al., 2011). Notably, the emergence of multi-
employer arrangements undermines previously institutionalised forms of strategic coordina-
tion at the macro level (Katz & Dabishire, 2000), because existing channels for negotiation 
and coordination erode. As a result, taken-for-granted channels for wage negotiation and em-
ployment relations are questioned in processes of corporate restructuring, and practices from 
other sectors, especially the service sector, as well as from other countries may be imported 
(Helfen, 2015; Holst, 2014). The uncertainty resulting from restructuring is likely to trigger 
agency as various actor groups enter negotiations about applying or revising the extant rules 
of ER/HR (Helfen & Sydow, 2013). 
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 ------------------------- 
FIGURE 1 about here 
------------------------- 
Figure 1 summarises our view on local ER as a social space or arena in which key actors 
make use of existing institutional, material, and power resources in order to enact and react to 
global competitive pressures towards organisational restructuring of local production sites. In 
the context of German ER, actor groups include managers and workers, but also employer 
associations, works councils, and labour unions. These different stakeholders initiate and par-
ticipate in micro-political practice with distinct goals, which are shaped by their particular 
interests and identities (Geppert & Dörrenbacher, 2014; Jackson, 2010). As discussed in more 
detail below, actors engage in a set of practices that can be sorted into the constructing of ra-
tionalities for action forming and sustaining representational identities and interests, political 
strategising, and mobilising specific resources to improve or sustain their bargaining power.  
Research setting: Chemical parks as locally bound production networks  
The German chemical industry provides a highly suitable setting for examining whether and 
how different HR/ER practices mediate the local restructuring into production networks for 
various reasons: First, the German industrial relations system can be regarded as a prime ex-
ample of a CME-type institution, involving deep strategic coordination (e.g. Hall & Soskice, 
2001).	  In industry-wide collective bargaining rounds, employer associations and a single un-
ion negotiate collective agreements for basic conditions, leaving space for company-level and 
local variation as negotiated between management and works councils. Even within this 
broader setting, ER in the (West) German chemical industry stand out in that they are charac-
terised by a stable social partnership (IG BCE & BAVC, 2009) and consensus seeking of both 
sides in collective bargaining (Kädtler, 2009; Markovits, 1986; Müller, 1997). ‘Encompass-
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ing’ employer associations, i.e. the employer association (BAVC) for labour issues and the 
trade association VCI for industrial policy, make the chemical industry an exemplar of strate-
gic coordination even for a CME setting (Behrens & Helfen, 2016; Müller-Jentsch, 2010).   
Second, the dynamics of creating and sustaining multi-employer work arrangements can be 
observed best in spatially bound production sites. This is the case for the German chemical 
industry which has long entertained integrated chemical production for technical reasons 
(Verbundchemie), “whereby the creation and development of production capacities and pro-
duction skills were designed to ensure that by-products of every chemical reaction and any 
energy released by a reaction were utilised for new reactions” (Kädtler, 2009: 233). Neverthe-
less, starting in the early 1990s, the industry underwent considerable organisational restructur-
ing (Voß, 2007), and in the process integrated organisations were replaced with networks as a 
response to the global pressure towards adopting shareholder value strategies. The early pio-
neers of the Chemiepark concept, such as Hoechst and Bayer, moved away from organisa-
tionally integrated chemical production and instead began to split up their production process 
into different business units along newly defined product lines. In many cases, these were 
spun-off successfully and publicly listed on the stock exchange.1 The industry's major reor-
ganisation also entailed Chemieparks as a new organisational form for production. In 
Chemieparks, service processes related to chemical production became separated from the 
client organisations and contracted out to legally independent service providers as well as 
other subcontractors. As a result, and notwithstanding the persistent technical interdependen-
cies of continuous chemical production processes (i.e. large equipment, material, and resource 
flows), the locally bound production network (‘Chemiepark’) has become the dominant or-
ganisational form of chemical production in Germany today. According to the German busi-
ness association of the chemical industry (VCI), there are 37 Chemieparks as of 2012, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lanxess and Covestro are Bayer spin-offs, and Celanese is a Hoechst spin-off, for example.  
2 Deutscher Bundestag. URL: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/093/1409300.pdf (last access: May 27, 
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year of our data collection, together employing about 227,000 employees (see Table 1), i.e. 
about two thirds of all the 324,300 employees working in the German chemical industry 
(Vassiliades, 2013).  
------------------------- 
TABLE 1 about here 
------------------------- 
In sum, the German chemical industry can be considered an illuminating case along two criti-
cal dimensions: first, it is a prime example of the strategic coordination typical for CMEs; 
second, it has undergone particularly significant restructuring, as can be seen from the emer-
gence of chemical parks. Following this extreme case selection logic, we opted to study the 
chemical industry as industry setting to explore micro-politics of HR/ER in multi-employer 
sites, because it promises critical insights into how global restructuring is mediated and enact-
ed locally. 
Research design: Comparative case study 
Case selection 
We opted for a comparative research design whereby we compare and contrast two multi-
employer-sites, one located in East Germany (Chemical Park East, CPE) and one in West 
Germany (Chemical Park West, CPW) that share several commonalities. Notably, both CPW 
and CPE have a large European MNE as a core client or lead firm (Provan & Kenis, 2008) 
and major firms at both sites are historically embedded in the social partnership ER of the 
German chemical industry. Also, both production networks have developed in broadly similar 
ways, albeit the CPE was already restructured in the mid-1990s, i.e. during the wave of privat-
isation after German Reunification, while CPW's restructuring started with a major strategy 
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shift of the major chemical corporation functioning as lead firm in 2001 (see Figure 2). Re-
search suggests that East German regions continue to show lower levels of collective bargain-
ing coverage and works council presence compared to regions in West Germany (Ellguth & 
Kohaut, 2015). Hence, CPW is embedded in a local supply chain environment with strong 
unions and well-established codetermination structures, while CPE is located in the more 
transformative supply chain environments of East Germany (Grünert & Lutz 1996; Turner, 
1998). 
------------------------- 
FIGURE 2 about here 
------------------------- 
Data collection and data analysis 
Our data come from a larger qualitative research project on industrial services in various core 
industries in Germany, such as car manufacturing, machine building, and the chemical indus-
try (Helfen, Nicklich, & Sydow, 2016).  In this paper, we focus on the developments we ob-
serve in the chemical industry. Because we engaged in a qualitative exploration that required 
a multi-perspective and multi-layered data collection approach, we included core producers, 
the site operator, and different service companies in our data collection. For our two German 
Chemieparks, we can draw on a total of 47 semi-structured interviews conducted between 
2011 and 2016. Of these we count 23 interviews as our core material because they had been 
with actors directly involved in ER of CPE and CPW as representatives from management, 
employer associations as well as unions and works councils. In these interviews, apart from 
ER/HR practices past and present, we asked about the restructuring process, the business rela-
tionships between service and client firms, as well as the way the network is managed in each 
case (see Table 2). All interviews were transcribed verbatim and systematically coded, using 
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atlas.ti, a software tool for qualitative analysis. In order to correct for inherent biases of dif-
ferent research methods (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), we triangulated our data. For this 
purpose, we collected a wide range of archival information, such as 12 collective agreements 
concluded between 1999 and 2013, 9 company reports of 2011 and 2012, and 19 business 
press articles. In addition, we can draw on 24 interviews with employer associations and un-
ions as well as management and works councils engaged in the same field context of chemical 
parks, such as other client firms, site operators, and auxiliary service such as temporary work, 
facility services, and technical services. These additional interviews enable us to contextualise 
our findings as they relate to broader trends in the industry. We also had the opportunity to 
present our findings in four meetings of Chemiepark works councillors and the union.  
------------------------- 
TABLE 2 about here 
------------------------- 
Data analysis involved three main steps. We first ‘zoomed’ (Nicolini, 2012) into the respec-
tive network configuration and micro-political processes by examining a typical subset of 
client and service providers within the two Chemieparks selected. Then, we combined archiv-
al information like statistics offered by the site operators and contextualising interviews with 
core interview material that enabled us to link back observed outcomes to particular sets of 
micro-level activities. In parallel, we screened the interviews together with the secondary ma-
terial to reconstruct the history of organisational restructuring and the formation of the two 
Chemieparks. We focused on examining how these developments influenced institutional 
practice in ER/HR on the ground. For coding the data, we started with identifying descriptions 
of single ER practices that either uphold established procedures across firms in the newly 
formed production network or initiatives trying to reform or adapt ER in light of the organisa-
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tional restructuring. Building on this coding we identified categories of practices of micro-
politics at the local level: constructing rationalities, political strategising, and mobilising re-
sources.  
 
Findings: Micro-politics of restructuring in interorganisational networks   
The emergence of ‘Chemieparks’  
As of 2012, both chemical parks, CPE and CPW, can be described as follows: Besides obvi-
ous differences with regard to lead firms, product range, and overall size of the sites, both 
chemical parks exhibit a similar network configuration, where core firms, their suppliers, and 
a host of service firms operate side-by-side in a single location (see Table 3). In their core, 
both Chemieparks consist of two or three major firms as core clients which are supported by a 
service provider being responsible for managing the production site, for example by providing 
technical infrastructure or running the fire department. The host of supplementary service 
providers can be divided into technical services providers (e.g. maintenance, production logis-
tics), auxiliary facility services (e.g. security, cleaning), and manpower services (e.g. staffing).  
The various legally autonomous firms are technically as well as contractually interdependent. 
Technical integration of production processes still forms the bracket around the various cli-
ents operating on site and stems from two sources: (1) connections between the client firms 
via the provision and exchange of side products and feedstock integration; (2) use of the same 
basic infrastructure services such as the pipeline system or the fire department provided by the 
site operator in each park. The interdependence of the core companies even goes so far that 
“if one manufacturer drops out, you get a problem with the production flow since there would 
be a lack of input materials for other plants” (Union representative 4, CPE). For example, in 
the CPE, the core client produces petrol as its main product and hydrogen as a side product, 
which is used by a further core client on site. In their production, both use the pipeline system 
19 
for the materials and rely on the fire service and personnel supply service of the site operator, 
but use a further service provider for machine cleaning. Thus, these ‘Chemieparks’ meet the 
criteria of multi-employer sites and locally-bound production networks as discussed above.  
------------------------- 
TABLE 3 about here 
------------------------- 
Enacting local restructuring and ER institutions 
In light of newly restructured organisational and production processes, institutions of ER need 
to be enacted locally, potentially undergoing change in form and function. Based on our rich 
qualitative data, we find that this involves the following three steps: constructing rationalities, 
political strategising, and mobilising resources. In the following, we describe how the various 
actors engaged in these practices, and how this led to the particular modification of macro-
level CME-type institutions at the meso-level of interorganisational networks over the course 
of firm restructuring in our two cases. 
The origins of the Chemiepark concept. Regarding the role of employer and industry associa-
tions, the Chemiepark story departs from strategic coordination in that the original concept 
was initiated more or less ad hoc under exceptional circumstances. The concept originates in 
the restructuring of the Eastern chemical industry after reunification, and our case, CPE, can 
be said to represent the pioneering case of the Chemiepark concept. In the process, policy 
coordination was dedicated to attract foreign investors for the chemical conglomerates of the 
East to save their existence in the first place.2 The federal government (‘Treuhandanstalt’), the 
state government, and the new investors played the main role in negotiating the terms and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Deutscher Bundestag. URL: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/093/1409300.pdf (last access: May 27, 
2016). 
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conditions of the privatisation. As private investors had an interest only in taking over single 
units, but were reluctant to take over the infrastructure services—not least because of ex-
pected high costs for dealing with environmental damage—the idea was to split off infrastruc-
ture services and arrange a structure in which new investors owned these operations jointly;3 
an ownership pattern still prevalent today in most Chemieparks. Successively, similar ap-
proaches were extended to other major sites in the Eastern chemical triangle (Leuna-
Bitterfeld-Wolfen), but not in a coordinated manner as each location implemented its own 
park concept and service provider. As such, the first impulse for the concept came from out-
side the German chemical industry and was not, at least formally, coordinated within the in-
dustry's association. However, in the Western part of Germany the example was imitated by 
Hoechst (Frankfurt) within only a couple of years, ending in the dissolution of Hoechst. Again 
this occurred under idiosyncratic, company-driven circumstances. In relation to this, a repre-
sentative of the employer association states: The concept “was created because of necessity. 
(…) Nobody could ever imagine that one of big three chemical companies decompose. But it 
happened comparatively fast [in the case of Hoechst]. (…) and it was very clever to make a 
virtue out of that necessity as they said: ok, we are going to describe it [the concept 
Chemiepark] as positive“	  (Employer association 3). The idea of Chemiepark thus started to 
spread throughout the industry, reaching the CPW in 2001/2. „First ChemCorp was a little bit 
cautious. But then they realised, that the concept of the Chemiepark is very, very useful and 
then established the name of Chempark“ (Employer association 3). Only in this second stage, 
visible activities of the associations set in as the concept of Chemiepark was deemed a suc-
cess. As a result, local associations started to launch joint marketing campaigns for the 
Chemiepark4 as a German brand for attracting foreign direct investments: “For us, it was a lot 
about the marketing of the chemical industry in that region. Particularly because the splitting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Europäische Kommission. Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften L260/1. URL: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31999D0646&from=DE (last access: May 27, 2016). 
4 Verband der chemischen Industrie (VCI). URL: http://www.chemicalparks.com/location/Seiten/default.aspx 
(last access: May 27, 2016). 
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of the former companies caused a lot of open space on the sites, for which we had to attract 
other firms. (…) among other things I was responsible for that“ (Employer association 3). 
Simultaneously, the BAVC negotiated with the IG BCE company-related deviations from the 
industry-wide collective agreement in order to keep the wage concessions for the stepwise 
outsourced industrial service units within an acceptable range for the union. In sum, while the 
Chemiepark concept was not created out of a coordinated strategy per se, but was rather the 
result of more idiosyncratic local processes, it was later increasingly embraced by employers 
and associations for marketing purposes.  
Modifying institutions of ER locally. Our first key empirical finding is that the HR/ER practic-
es of the multi-employer sites lead to varying outcomes in our two cases. Here, local enact-
ment of organisational restructuring starts with unsettling previously taken-for-granted tem-
plates, norms, and rules in ER, and thus opens up space for micro-political processes to un-
fold. In the wake of the restructuring process of the local sites, the industry-wide negotiation 
pattern in collective bargaining is disrupted as single production processes are threatened to 
be excluded from collective agreement coverage and decoupled from company-level labour 
representation: “What we call a 'Chemiepark' today used to be an integrated company. (…)  
But after all this subcontracting, companies are starting to argue with us: 'We do logistics or 
technical services. The collective agreement for the chemical industry is not applicable to us'” 
(Union representative 1). While both Chemieparks in the early 1990s used to be covered by 
one collective agreement applicable to various groups of work, the reorganisation and disinte-
gration into legally autonomous entities created a host of heterogeneous agreements. Corre-
spondingly, using the year 1999 as a benchmark, the wage scales for different activities have 
developed in divergent directions across network layers. At the core client firms, which still 
apply the industry-level agreement of the chemical industry, we observe a nominally higher 
pay scale for all groups in 2012 as compared to 1999. In contrast, the overall pattern of pay 
scale development reveals that the workers in the newly formed service companies of the first 
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layer are at about the same level as in 1999, whereas those in the second layer of auxiliary 
services have even decreased.  
------------------------- 
TABLE 4 about here 
------------------------- 
In 2012, for the 120 companies at the CPE, we find that 11 firms apply the industry-wide col-
lective agreement of the German chemical industry, while 10 firms apply industry-wide 
agreements with other unions, 60 firms have firm-level agreements with various unions, and 
39 firms are not covered by any collective agreement. Again, we find that in the case of CPE 
there is an ordering of the various collective agreements' pay scales according to the network 
layer of the respective organisation (see Table 4).  Compared to the collective agreement of 
the chemical industry in East Germany, which ranges from €12,90 to €30,28 per hour, the pay 
scales in collective agreements for the service providers in the first network layer (i.e. the in-
frastructure provider or technical services) are about 15 to 20 per cent lower than for their 
clients. This is noteworthy, because service workers are engaged alongside the workers of 
client firms and also have similar skill sets and work experience. What is more, workers in 
organisations of the third network layer earn even less. For example, a security agent is paid a 
maximum of €9,70 per hour.  
A very similar ordering can be found in the case of CPW, although the overall wage level is 
higher than in the case of CPE (see Table 4). Nevertheless, there are some relevant qualitative 
local differences between the two parks. For example, the overall number of collective 
agreements is considerably lower at CPW. This is due to the fact that in the CPW, most of the 
70 companies on site apply the industry-wide collective agreement negotiated with the chemi-
cal union for which the pay scale ranges from €13,41 to €32,19 per hour. Second, in the CPW 
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the number of companies not covered by a collective agreement is lower than in the CPE, 
where "there are also companies which have nothing to do with a collective agreement” (Un-
ion representative 4, CPE). Taken together, we interpret these differences as indicating vary-
ing outcomes of organisational restructuring in light of global competition, because the previ-
ously institutionalised broad coverage of collective agreements is maintained to varying de-
grees at the newly formed meso-level. In the following section, we trace these different out-
comes to particular practices at the network level.  
Constructing rationalities.  Based on our empirical case material, we find that the various 
actors involved in the newly created multi-employer arrangements engaged in the construc-
tion of rationalities for micro-political engagement. This constructing involves making sense 
of the new reality of production networks. Here, we find that the key actors' experiences dur-
ing the initiation of the restructuring phase also shape their construction of identities and in-
terests to partake in the micro-political restructuring ‘game’.  
------------------------- 
TABLE 5 about here 
------------------------- 
One aspect of this constructing is how the organisational ‘heritage’ (cf. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
2002) of the two chemical parks is enacted differently by management and labour representa-
tives in retelling the parks' history. In the case of CPW, labour representatives still share a 
sense of having been part of the same organisation, and they also have many personal rela-
tionships with each other. In many cases, these go back to the time when they were apprentic-
es in the early 1980s and were further deepened during their common experience in the strug-
gles involved in the restructuring process. Emphasising the importance of the park's organisa-
tional heritage for shaping today's ER, one of the CPW's labour representative states: “The 
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basis of our cooperation is the framework of the past (…). We [the different works councils] 
all came from the ChemCorp works council” (Works Council service provider B, CPW). In 
fact, three members of the works council committee had been employees of ChemCorp and 
are now works councillors of a newly formed maintenance company, a logistics company, and 
the site operator.  
Management makes sense of the restructuring in a distinct way: “Sociologically you don´t 
have one firm, but many firms” (Employer association 2). This perspective is echoed by man-
agement at the firm level as well, which highlights the autonomy of the single entity within 
the park: Although “there are synergies and an optimisation of resources (…) all companies 
operate on their own” (Management service provider A, CPW). Apart from mere renaming, 
the now legally independent subunits' identity formation on behalf of management is also 
revealed by the real estate strategy of the client corporation in terms of the rental fees charged 
to its legally independent subsidiaries located at the site. This policy forced the works council 
of the site operator to move offices off-site because it could not afford the rent. However, this 
‘managing without history’ runs into communication problems with workers and the local 
community as the corporation is still the owner of the service unit. One example of this is the 
conflict about erasing the former company's logo from publicly visible places, such as the 
main entrance, which encountered severe resistance by the local community. Furthermore, the 
employees of the service provider were initially not invited to celebrate the anniversary of 
ChemCorp. The works council of the site operator challenged this rationale, and instead ar-
gued that they should be invited to the festivities, given that some of them had worked at 
ChemCorp for more than 30 years. Finally, after negotiating the employees of the service 
provider were invited as well. We interpret this as illustrating the contested identity and or-
ganisational boundaries.   
Regarding the construction of rationalities at CPE, local management points to the circum-
stances after the transformation in East Germany to make sense of the network restructuring: 
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“CPE was born out of a misery (…), which has the result that the site isn´t an integrated cor-
poration anymore, but many” (Management service provider A, CPE). Similarly, another 
management representative claims that the various firms operate “totally independently” 
(Management service provider B, CPE).  Interestingly, in the case of CPE, we find that labour 
representatives adopt this rationale: "From the perspective of East Germany there was nothing 
to lose anymore. Everything was destroyed (…) and then you have an open mind to think dif-
ferently (…) so the idea [of a chemical park] was born out of necessity (...) If you start at ze-
ro, and you have the chance to employ 9000 people, you say to yourself: That's better than no 
one” (Works Council service provider A, CPE). Consequentially, there is a broadly shared 
idea that CPE consists of several independent firms despite technical integration through the 
infrastructure management, whereas labour representatives in the CPW argue that the newly 
formed network needs to be understood as a whole network. In contrast to what we find in the 
case of CPW, organisational heritage plays a strikingly different role in the case of CPE. As a 
result, the organisational restructuring is construed as a reality and a necessity for economic 
survival by both management and labour. Notably, this can be traced back to the unique his-
torical circumstances in which CPE was formed.  
Political strategising.  Following on different rationalities of how to make sense of the newly 
created production network, the key actors engage in different approaches of political strate-
gising. Here, one key issue revolves around the question of whether labour representatives 
feel responsible for peripheral workers at second- or third-layer network firms. In the case of 
CPE, we find that the works council tends to delegate responsibility. Accordingly, one works 
councillor points out that “I cannot say this or that company has agency workers. (…) I do not 
know that because I do not have their statistics” (Works Council service provider A, CPE). 
Similarly, the works councillor claims to be incapable of influencing some management deci-
sions, a statement not commonly expected in light of previously existing social partnership 
ER institutions in CMEs: “I´m convinced that we as the works council cannot control such 
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processes [of subcontracting] (…) only the people with power [management] can decide if a 
part of a company will be sub-contracted. (…) [T]he only way to keep the people on board is 
to establish our own subsidiaries that have more favourable conditions for management than 
those in the chemical agreement. This way we have saved 40 jobs in the security area”	  
(Works Council service provider A, CPE). In fact, in the case of CPE, political strategising 
reinforces the rationale of viewing chemical parks as involving largely independent units: 
“We are all separate units, at the end of the day everybody has his own management to nego-
tiate with” (Works Council OilCorp, CPE).  
In contrast to that, works councils at CPW engage in political strategising envisioning a more 
holistic and ambitious role for labour unions and works councils: “[As a works council,] you 
have to make sure that you can take influence on decisions in terms of external service firms –
which are chosen and what is the relationship to them—via committees such as the superviso-
ry board” (Works Council service provider A, CPW). Management, for its part, argues that 
different wage setting is necessary for preserving competitiveness: “The cost structure of a 
service firm is really different from that of a producer (…) they have the problem that their 
services are also offered on the market by firms which do not pay the collective agreement of 
the chemical industry” (Employer association 2); “The service was not competitive enough 
(…) the outsourcing was an important and necessary step; also to keep the producers compet-
itive and to keep them on site“ (Management service provider A, CPW). As such, we find 
markedly different political strategising in the case of CPW: while labour representatives en-
gage in activities aiming at (re-)integrating the formally separate network firms, management 
tries to substantiate and sustain the legal independence. In contrast to what we find in the case 
of CPE, CPW actors have successfully maintained previously disrupted institutions of ER and 
HR. For example, the union has bargained for a collective agreement in which collective bar-
gaining coverage is made a contract criterion for third-party service-provision.  
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Mobilising resources.  In enacting these local struggles concerning the modification of macro 
institutions, we find that actors mobilise specific resources in local micro-political processes. 
In the case of the CPE, we observe that collaboration among works councils, and works coun-
cils and unions, is limited to the core firms and the first-layer site operator, although the site 
operator's works council has created a working group, in which they “exchange information 
and reports about what the management does at other companies” (Works Council service 
provider A, CPE). It is described as a “lax committee, not so formalistic, without rules of pro-
cedure and protocol” (Works Council service provider A, CPE). In contrast, management 
uses competition-based arguments in order to sustain firm separation and workforce segmen-
tation: “Price is an issue in every customer dialogue” (Management service providers A, 
CPE). Furthermore, management engages in training activities aimed at propagating distinct 
identities of the newly formed service firms: “This was a big challenge (…) and we try to 
solve it with trainings (…) and we keep on doing that in order to preserve this attitude“ 
(Management service provider A, CPE).  
In the case of CPW, we find that CPW works councils and the union engage jointly in a net-
work-wide collaboration that crosses the newly installed organisational boundaries, and actu-
ally extends to the core and the first and second layer of the network. This allows them to re-
sist management's competition-based threat scenarios: “No workplace can be kept if it's not 
competitive” (Management service provider A, CPW). Most notably, the CPW works coun-
cils also share an experience in the struggle around the corporation's organisational restructur-
ing. Untypical for the labour-management-collaboration in the chemical industry the restruc-
turing was accompanied by worker protest: “We [the employees of the ChemCorp] shocked 
the world of ChemCorp, because they weren't used to that [form and degree of protest]. Tra-
ditionally, the union walked with the banner around the plant and that was it. But we didn´t 
stop (…) We said we want a solution under the umbrella of the chemical union's collective 
agreement”	   (Works Council Service-Provider B, CPW). Through this process, labour was 
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successful in installing network-wide employee representation through creating and bringing 
together works councils in all single units of CPW's production network. Using this newly 
created tool for coordination, works councils and the union join forces in cases where man-
agement decisions have network-wide repercussions for workers. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Our comparative case study of two German Chemieparks has examined how organisational 
restructuring of previously large, integrated units is shaped and enacted within the CME-
setting of Germany through local ER. Applying a meso-level lens, we examined the emer-
gence, formation, and governance of local production networks as embedded in different local 
supply chain environments, and thereby provide unique insights into the processes and prac-
tices through which global pressures are mediated on the ground. In sum, our empirical data 
suggests that we can explain varying outcomes in terms of wage levels and coverage of col-
lective agreements by looking at the various micro-political processes enfolding as actors en-
act institutions of ER and HR, and in the process sustain, reform, or modify them. In the pro-
cess, works councils, unions, and management shape institutions in light of the new reality of 
production networks.   
With regard to institutions of ER, we find that single industry-level agreements, as character-
istic for the strategic kind of coordination common in CMEs, are increasingly substituted with 
a multitude of single firm-level agreements for various client-service provider-constellations. 
Our data suggests that the newly agreed upon wage scales correspond to the network position 
of the respective organisation within the production network. Using rich, qualitative data, we 
show how organisational restructuring disrupts previously taken-for-granted templates, 
norms, and rules, and how various actors engage in sets of activities and practices aimed to 
maintain, create, or reform institutions (Lawrence et al., 2009), here those of ER and HR 
within a changing local supply chain environment. Comparing the two chemical parks, CPW 
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and CPE, we find that labour and management engage in three broad sets of activities in the 
process of local enactment: they first construct rationalities, and in the process make sense of 
and interpret organisational restructuring in a particular way. This then (re)shapes their politi-
cal strategising, meaning that they develop certain strategies to either facilitate closer collabo-
ration and re-integration of the formally separated entities, or, alternatively, engage in activi-
ties that sustain and further deepen separation. For these purposes, the various actors utilise 
and mobilise certain sets of resources to be deployed in micro-political processes in order to 
attain their objectives.  
By identifying these three categories of practices through which local actors enact a particular 
institutional disruption, our study extends existing concepts of institutional dynamics  by tak-
ing local agency and associated micro-politics more seriously. More specifically, our case 
comparison shows that the differences in the ER practices deployed in each chemical park 
have implications for the observed outcome in terms of collective bargaining by altering how 
the process of restructuring unfolds. Although both cases of chemical parks are the result of 
organisational restructuring, we find a more gradual disintegration of previously existing ER 
at CPW, while restructuring at CPE resembles a more radical disruption of ER. Similarly, 
disintegration is more contested in the case of CPW, while actors at CPE seem to agree that 
the creation of the chemical park was necessary in order to ensure survival within a shifting 
competitive landscape. Regarding the use of resources, we find that labour representatives at 
CPW were able to build and leverage new and existing interorganisational ties in order to 
connect the newly formed entities. Thereby, they created a consultation and information-
sharing device which has been used as a vehicle for micro-political influence. In stark con-
trast, employee representatives at CPE failed to create these collaborative ties; instead, the 
works council engaged in co-management. However, both cases depart from accustomed ER 
practice of social partnership, thereby illustrating institutional modification.  
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With these findings, our study makes three contributions to the existing literature: first, we 
build on the literature on VC to further strengthen the argument that institutional mediation 
occurs locally. Here, we make the important observation that this locality is often represented 
by production networks, which emerge as important meso-level arenas for institutional modi-
fication and associated micro-political processes. In this context, we further extend previous 
research emphasising the role of sub-national variation in institutional settings (Jackson, 
2010; Lane & Wood, 2009) by identifying the production network as critical for how local 
variation materialises. Here, we conceive of networks as being both an arena in which micro-
political processes take place as well as entities whose governance is open to strategising for 
locally bound actors (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2008).  
Second, we build on research that links macro-level institutional dynamics with micro-level 
activities (cf. Deeg & Jackson, 2007), and identify three clusters of practices that actors en-
gage in during micro-political struggles. Importantly, institutional dynamics are the outcome 
of enacted mediation, whereby reflexive actors make sense of and then engage in institutional 
processes. This suggests that even as macro-level institutions come under pressure, not least 
due to organisational restructuring, previously existing forms of strategic coordination in 
CMEs may be emulated at the meso level of interorganisational networks by creating and 
sustaining functional equivalents (cf. Fortwengel & Jackson, 2016). This is an important theo-
retical insight, because it shifts attention from broad VoC to more local levels as the appropri-
ate unit of analysis.  
Third, we qualify the findings of research that suggests that restructuring tends to undermine 
the role of labour (e.g. Froud, Haslam, Johal, & Williams, 2000) by introducing local ER 
practices as being influential for the outcomes observed at the local level. Going beyond the 
structural impact of core and periphery, the local practicing of ER in production networks also 
exerts agentic influence on network and supply chain governance to claim a say in how value 
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creation is structured and its benefits distributed (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). Our 
paper also speaks to recent elaborations in ER theory according to which unions need to fol-
low in MNEs' steps by establishing their own transnational activities (Helfen & Fichter, 2013; 
Lakhani, Kuruvilla, & Avgar, 2013), and also by showing that there is opportunity in engag-
ing directly with the local level (Kalleberg, 2009; Wills, 2009). Here, we further support re-
cent claims that local actors may seize the opportunity to exploit ‘resonant places’ (Anderson, 
2015) and in the process bring about further variation in ER practices to account for the emer-
gence of interorganisational networks. From this angle, organisational restructuring may un-
settle existing institutions of strategic coordination at the macro level; yet it opens up oppor-
tunity space to create new forms of strategic coordination at the network level through local 
agency within VoC.  
Looking ahead, we see promise in further comparative studies to explore the role of local mi-
cro-politics in processes of institutional mediation. For example, one boundary condition of 
the arguments developed here pertains to other actor constellations in different industry set-
tings. We have selected the chemical industry as our research setting not in the least because it 
is a prime example of strategic coordination typical for a CME, i.e., involving strong social 
partners. Meanwhile, it is conceivable that industries with less powerful employer associa-
tions and labour unions, such as service sectors, may find it harder to defend or transform 
previously exiting institutions of ER and HR. In fact, these considerations speak to the main 
argument as developed in this paper: while the outcome of restructuring processes will be 
highly relevant for various debates on stability vs. change as well as coherence vs. heteroge-
neity of different varieties of capitalism (Jessop, 2011), from the perspective of wage ine-
quality and other forms of segmentation they are not pre-determined, but rather depend on the 
particular micro-political practices various agents engage in to make sense of and respond to 
broader changes. This also relates to potential differences in network governance and coordi-
nation (Provan & Kenis, 2008). As production networks gain in importance as arenas for mi-
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cro-political struggles, their governance structures are likely to be relevant in explaining vary-
ing outcomes of institutional mediation and work. While this paper has examined two cases in 
the German chemical industry setting, it will be important to engage in comparative analyses 
across institutions, sectors, production networks, and countries, both LMEs and CMEs, to 
further our understanding and theorising of organisational restructuring and institutional me-
diation.
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Appendix  
Figure 1: A framework of practicing ERs in multi-employer production networks. 
 
Figure 2: From integrated production to multi-employer sites: Emergence of network configura-
tion in two cases, 1990-2012.  
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Table 1: The empirical phenomenon: Chemical parks in Germany. 
 Germany West East 
Number of 
Chemieparks 
37 30 7 
Number of employees ~ 227,000 ~ 177,000   ~ 50,000 
Source: Own calculation, based on data given in VCI (2012).  
 
Table 2: Data sources. 
Source Dimension 
Employment relations  
(firm-level, network level) 
Chemical Park East (CPE) Chemical Park West (CPW) 
Semi-structured 
interviews (23) 
Micro-political  
practices 
3 interviews with the man-
agement and 4 interviews 
with the works council of 
core client and service pro-
viders respectively; 2 inter-
views with the unions and 1 
with the employer associa-
tion  
 
site visit, follow-up inter-
view, group discussion 
1 interview with the manage-
ment and 6 interviews with the 
works council of core client 
and service providers respec-
tively; 4 interviews with the 
unions and 2 with the employ-
er association 
 
site visit; follow-up interview, 
group discussion 
Contextualising 
interviews (24) Field context 
10 interviews with union representatives and 7 interviews with 
employer associations, 6 managers and 1 works councils for 
core clients and auxiliary service providers like temporary 
agency work, facility services, and technical services 
Analysis of formal 
documents and 
secondary material 
ER outcomes  
12 collective agreements of core clients as well as service 
providers; material regarding the history of each chemical 
park; 9 company reports; statistics provided by the chemical 
park management; official statistics 
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Table 3: Overview: The two chemical parks.  
Overall network  
configuration Chemical Park East (CPE) Chemical Park West (CPW) 
Number of  
companies on site 120 companies 70 companies 
Number 
of em-
ployees 
Total 9,000 7,000 
Core client 630 1,430 
Site operator 700 686 
Ownership structure of site 
operator 7 different clients 
ChemCorp (majority shareholder) 
and other client (spin-off from 
ChemCorp) 
 
Table 4: Collectively agreed wages per hour by network layers, in € (nominal; 2012/*1999). 
  CPE CPW 
Clients Collective agreement 
chemical industry 
7,52 – 17,30* 
(40h/week) 
10,01 – 23,33* 
(37,5h/week) 
12,90 – 30,28 
(40h/week) 
13,41 – 32,19 
(37,5h/week) 
First-Layer-Firms Park operator 11,61 – 25,54 
(40h/week) 
11,13 – 23,65 
(39h/week) 
Service provider 8,00 – 26,27  
(38,5h/week) 
11,85 – 20,74 
(40h/week) 
Service provider 9,01 – 19,79 
(40h/week) 
9,01 – 19,79 
(40h/week) 
Second-Layer-
Firms 
Temporary work 7,50 – 15,91 
(35h/week) 
8,19 – 18,20 
(35h/week) 
Cleaning 7,33 – 12,04 
(39h/week) 
8,82 – 14,91 
(39h/week) 
Security 7,00 – 9,70 
(39,5h/week) 
8,15 – 13,45 
(39,5h/week) 
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Table 5: Findings: Enacting institutions locally. 
Representative Quote Theme Dimension 
“The basis of our cooperation is the framework of the 
past (…). We [the different works councils] all came 
from the ChemCorp works council” (Works council 
service provider B, CPW) 
Interpreting 
organisational 
heritage 
(1) Constructing  
 rationalities “CPE was born out of a misery (…), which has the 
result that the site isn´t an integrated corporation 
anymore, but many” (Management service provider 
A, CPE). 
Justifying  
organisational 
restructuring 
“[As a works council] you have to make sure that you 
can take influence on decisions in terms of external 
service firms—which are chosen and what is the rela-
tionship to them—via committees such as the supervi-
sory board” (Works council service provider A, 
CPW) 
Taking responsibility 
(2) Political  
strategising “[The companies] at the site are pursuing their own 
agenda, albeit they are all connected via product 
flows, and there is a kind of economic dependence. 
But they all have their different goals and under-
standing in terms of employment practices“ (Works 
council OilCorp, CPE) 
Delegating 
responsibility 
“No workplace can be kept if it's not competitive” 
(Management service provider A, CPW) 
Developing 
threat scenarios 
(3) Mobilising  
specific resources 
“They [works councils of other companies] call me 
and ask: ‘Can we meet at your office? They [the em-
ployer of the other company] presented me a plant-
level agreement with their works council: ‘Can you 
have a look on it?’ Regarding these things we support 
each other” (Works council service provider A, CPE) 
Developing new 
mechanisms for co-
ordination 
 
	  
